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Executive Knowledge of  
White-Collar in Crime Business 
Organizations in Norway
Research Design for Empirical Study
Superintendent Professor Rune Glomseth
Professor Dr. Petter Gottschalk 
The five hundred and seventeen largest business 
companies in terms of annual turnover were identi-
fied in Norway for our empirical study of white-col-
lar crime. A letter was mailed to the chief financial 
officer asking him or her to fill in the questionnaire 
to be found on a web site using a password found in 
the letter. The research was carried out by a web-
based questionnaire combined with a letter to the 
largest business organizations in Norway.
 65 respondents filled in the questionnaire after the 
first letter, 45 responses were received after a reminder, 
and another 31 responses were received after a second 
reminder. Thus, a total of 141 complete responses were 
received. 141 complete responses out of 517 potential 
responses represent a response rate of 27 percent. In 
addition, 36 incomplete responses were received, crea-
ting a gross response rate of 34 percent. The survey 
web site was open to responses from January to April 
in 2010.
 Separate analysis was conducted on the first set of 
responses, then the second set, and finally the third set 
included. This analysis shows few changes in results 
when moving from 65 via 110 to 141 responses. Thus, 
the analysis suggests that non-respondents might have 
provided similar responses to actual respondents.
 The average number of employees in the 141 busi-
ness organizations with complete answers was 1,719 
persons. The largest responding firm in terms of emplo-
yees had 30,000 persons in their staff.
 Respondents were asked to type in their current po-
sition, even though the letter was specifically mailed to 
the top executive in charge of finance often called chief 
financial officer (CFO). Most of the respondents were in-
deed CFOs, but some were CEOs, corporate controllers, 
managers of finance, and chief group controllers.
 The average age among respondents was 48 years 
among the first 65 re sponses, and they had 4.4 years of 
college and university education on average. The ave-
rage age decreased to 46 years when the first reminder 
responses arrived, while the average education increa-
sed to 4.8 years. There were 91 men and 19 women res-
ponding after the first reminding letter.
The average age remained at 46 years after receipt of the 
final 31 responses, while average education continued to 
increase to 5.1 years. There were 117 men and 24 women 
among the total 141 respondents. The only change, there-
fore, seems to indicate that higher educated persons tend 
to respond more frequently after reminders.
 The purpose of this text is to create insights into exe-
cutives’ knowledge of white-collar crime in Norwegian 
business organizations. That involves mapping their per-
ceptions of magnitude, attitude, risks and offenders. In 
terms of risk, respondents suggest that probability of 
white-collar crime is low, while conse quences when oc-
curring are substantial. Most likely position category for 
white-collar crime is a purchasing manager in charge of 
procurement, followed by a marketing manager, and a 
person in executive management. It is argued that inter-
nal and external control authorities need to focus less on 
routines and regulations and more on persons in vulne-
rable positions.
 Both descriptive statistics as well as correlation ana-
lysis in this text provide new insights into the extent of 
white-collar crime, as well as attitudes, risks and vulne-
rable positions for white-collar crime. Concerning exe-
cutives own know ledge, they claim to be more compe-
tent in discovering white-collar crime than investigating 
such crime. They also claim an increased police compe-
tence in this field in Norway. Survey research was ap-
plied to find empirical answers to questions such as: The 
occupants of what roles and positions in the organiza-
tions are most likely to commit white-collar crime? What 
is the probability of various crime types being commit-
ted? What are the consequences of various crime types?
Magnitude and Executive Attitude
The first set of questions was concerned with the extent 
of and attitudes towards white-collar crime. Responses 
were measured on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) 
to 5 (completely agree). Average responses to all items 
are listed in Table 1.
 Given an average score of 3 representing neither 
agreement nor disagree ment, most statements achieve 
varying degrees of disagreement in the Table. The first 
Police and Criminal Science
24 | Global Security 2012
agreement is related to the statements that our industry 
has less white-collar crime as compared to other indust-
ries. The second slight agreement is related to the state-
ment that the extent of white-collar crime has grown 
substantially in recent years in Norway. Third and final 
agreement supports marginally that there is a greater 
threat of white-collar crime in other industries than the 
respondent’s industry.
 Strongest disagreement is reported on the statement 
that there is more white-collar crime in the public sector. 
This means that respondents have the opinion that there 
is more white-collar crime in the private sector, i.e. busi-
ness companies and corporations. Respondents do not 
agree with the statement that the financial crisis that 
occurred in 2009 has caused an increase in white-collar 
crime. The argument for this statement is that white-
collar crime is more likely in turbulent times. However, 
respondents do not agree.
Respondents tell us further that companies are gene-
rally not competent at disclosing white-collar crime, and 
that national police is generally not competent in comba-
ting white-collar crime. Respondents find that white-col-
lar crime is taken seriously in society, as they disagree 
with the statement that there is a tendency to bagatelle 
white-collar crime in society. Finally, respondents do not 
really agree that the extent of white-collar crime is sub-
stantial in Norway.
 Correlation analysis was applied to responses in Tab-
le 1 in order to establish potential relationships between 
statements related to magnitude of and attitude towards 
white-collar crime. Correlation coefficients are listed in 
Table 2. Correlations may be significant at the p<.05 le-
vel, which is indicated by * in the table. Correlations may 
be more significant at the p<.01 level, which is indicated 
by ** in the table (Hair et al., 2010).
 The strongest significant correlation in the Table is 
between the statements that “companies are generally 
competent in discovering white-collar crime” (labeled 
Corporate Competence in the Table) and “the extent of 
white-collar crime has increased as a consequence of the 
financial crises” (labeled Finance Crisis in the Table). 
The correlation coefficient is 0.769 with a significance 
that is better than 0.01. When conducting correlation 
analysis, we are unable to conclude on cause-and-effect 
relationship in terms of causality. We only know that the-
re are significant co-variations among variables. We sim-
ply do not know whether more crime has caused impro-
ved competence, or improved competence has caused 
improved crime. However, from a theoretical point of 
view, it is more likely that more crime caused by the glo-
bal financial crisis has caused an improvement in corpo-
rate competence to combat financial crime.
 Another interesting correlation is between “the ex-
tent of white-collar crime has increased as a conse-
quence of the financial crises” and “white-collar crime 
has a tendency to be considered a bagatelle in society”. 
Here is the correlation coefficient 0.355 at significance 
better than 0.01. In causal terms, either the increase in 
crime is caused by the bagatelle attitude, or the bagatel-
le attitude is caused by increase in white-collar crime.
 A third interesting correlation is between “the extent 
of white-collar crime has increased substantially in re-
cent years” and “white-collar crime has a ten dency to 
be bagatelle in society”. As in the above correlation, it 
seems more likely that a bagatelle and leisure-faire atti-
tude has lead to increase, rather than increase has lead 
to a bagatelle attitude. Only theoretical underpinning 
can help clarify the causal direction.
 A fourth interesting correlation is found between 
“the extent of white-collar crime has increased signifi-
cantly in recent years” and “the financial police is ge-
nerally competent in investigating white-collar crime”. 
A possible link is that respondents believe that financial 
police has improved as a consequence of crime increase.
 The next significant correlation is between the state-
ments that “there is more white-collar crime in the pub-
lic sector” and “business companies are generally com-
petent at disclosing white-collar crime”. In this causality, 
there might be a belief that public sector experiences 
more white-collar crime, because that sector is not as 
qualified as the private sector to combat financial crime.
 There is one remaining correlation of significance in 
Table 2. The correlation coefficient is negative, which 
Police and Criminal Science
Rank Statement Score
1 White-collar crime is more common in other industries 3.1
2 The extent of white-collar crime has grown substantially in recent years 3.1
3 There is a greater threat of white-collar crime in other industries 3.0
4 The extent of white-collar crime is substantial in this country 2.9
5 There is a tendency to bagatelle white-collar crime in society 2.9
6 National police is generally competent in combating white-collar crime 2.8
7 Companies are generally competent at disclosing white-collar crime 2.8
8 The extent of white-collar crime has increased because of financial crises 2.7
9 There is more white-collar crime in the public sector 2.6
Table 1
Average Responses to Questions on Magnitude and Attitudes Re-
lated to White-collar Crime
(1 – Completely Disagree. 5 – Completely Agree)
Crime
Attitude
Threat
Others
Spread
Others
Public
Sector
Crime
Extent
Crime
Growth
Finance
Crisis
Corporate
Compe -
tence
Police Compe tence .435** .167 .222 -.269* -.006 .315* .230 .184
Crime Attitude .136 .075 .253 .008 .346** .355** .302*
Threat Others .016 -.029 -.024 .032 .193 .314*
Spread Others .119 .149 -.174 .102 .044
Public Sector .301* -.209 .229 .298*
Crime Extent -.181 .042 .063
Crime Growth .223 .136
Finance Crisis .769**
Table 2
Correlation Coefficients for Respondents’ Replies to Statements 
about Magnitude of and Attitudes towards White-Collar Crime (Sta-
tistical Significance Better than .05 at * and Better than .01 at **)
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means that variation occurs in opposite direction. When 
respondents agree more with the statement that “finance 
police is generally competent at investigating white-col-
lar crime”, then they agree less with the statement “the-
re is more white-collar crime in the public sector”. Oppo-
site, respondents agree more with the statement “there 
is more white-collar crime in the public sector” when 
they agree less with the statement “finance police is ge-
nerally competent at investigating white-collar crime”.
 Some correlations were expected to be significant, 
but they are not. An ex ample is the correlation between 
“there is a greater danger of white-collar crime in other 
industries than in ours” and “white-collar crime is more 
common in other industries than in ours”. The correlati-
on coefficient is very small at 0.016 and not significant. 
In the survey, these two statements achieved the high-
est score of agreement among respondents, as listed in 
Table 1. But there is no correlation. Thus, respondents 
make a distinction between danger and common, where 
it might be greater danger and less common, and also 
less danger and more common. For example, some res-
pondents indicate that there is not necessarily a greater 
danger of white-collar crime, even if it is more common.
 Further statistical analysis can be applied to collec-
ted data in terms of factor analysis (Hair et al., 2010). 
By applying factor analysis to collected responses, fac-
tors can be extracted from items, where each factor will 
have one or more statements included. There were nine 
statements about magnitude and attitude, resulting in 
four factors as listed in Table 3.
 While there are significant loadings on all four fac-
tors in Table 3, there is no obvious theoretical relati-
onship between statements loading on the same fac-
tor. Therefore, another approach might be confirmatory 
factor analysis rather than exploratory factor analysis. 
Exploratory factor analysis as applied in Table 3 enab-
les distribution of statements, while confirmatory factor 
analysis develops significance of one factor by excluding 
statements without relationships to the remaining state-
ments (Hair et al., 2010).
 When confirmatory factor analysis is applied to all 
nine statements, the reliability in terms of Cronbachs 
alpha is only 0.591. By excluding the following state-
ments, reliability is improved to an acceptable level 
of 0.704:
 - There is a greater danger of white-collar crime in 
other industries.
 - White-collar crime is more common in other 
industries.
 - There is more white-collar crime in the public sector.
 - There is a substantial magnitude of white-collar 
crime in this country.
 - These are remaining statements included in the new 
factors.
 - Financial police is competent at investigating white-
collar crime.
 - White-collar crime has a tendency to be bagatelle in 
society.
 - The extent of white-collar crime has increased subs-
tantially in recent years.
 - The extent of white-collar crime has increased as a 
consequence of the financial crisis.
 - Business corporations are generally competent at 
combating financial crime.
 From a theoretical point of view, these five state-
ments can be interpreted as respondents’ degree of per-
ceived seriousness as it comes to white-collar crime.
 In an empirical study by Bucy et al. (2008), greed is 
the most commonly cited reason as to why trusted busi-
ness executives engage in white-collar criminal acts. Mo-
ney, financial gain, and green were cited by almost eve-
ry participant in the study as the motive for committing 
crime with some listing this as the sole motivator and 
others including it among top reasons. Beyond greed, 
participants noted opportunity, a sense of entitlement, 
arrogance, competitiveness, and rationalization as mo-
tivating factors. Some participants in the study thought 
that business executives are often motivated by fear of 
failure or of losing one’s job or life-style.
 Heath (2008) argues that there is no doubt that 
the vast majority of white-collar crime is motivated by 
greed. Typically, individuals who commit occupa tional 
crimes are seeking to enrich themselves personally, just 
as firms engaged in corporate crime aspire to improve 
their financial performance.
Risk Probability and Consequence
The second set of questions was concerned with risks of 
white-collar crime measured along the two risk dimensi-
ons of probability and consequence. In Table 4 average 
scores are ranked according to consequence.
 The most severe consequence is related to financial 
misconduct by chief executives in the company with a con-
sequence score of 3.1. The least severe consequence is 
related to embezzlement of valuables from the company.
 The most likely white-collar crime is bribery 
Police and Criminal Science
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Police Competence: Combating Financial Crime .630
Crime Attitude: Bagatelle of Financial Crime .759
Threat Others: Financial Crime Threat in Other Industries .729
Spread Others: Financial Crime Extent in Other Industries .840
Public Sector: More Financial Crime than in Private Sector .859
Crime Extent: Magnitude of Financial Crime in Society .562
Crime Growth: Increase in Financial Crime in Society .752
Finance Crisis: Cause of Growing Financial Crime .729
Corporate Competence: Combating Financial Crime .833
Table 3
Factor Analysis of Respondents’ Replies to Statements about Ma-
gnitude and Attitude Related to White-collar Crime
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(corruption) from vendors and customers, followed by 
embezzlement of valuables from the company. The most 
unlikely crime types are to include non-existing con-
tracts in income statements and laundering of money 
from crime in the company.
 In comparison, a study in Germany found that the 
most frequently recurrent forms of white-collar crime, 
fraud and theft, are associated with comparatively mar-
ginal average damages, whereby the rather less com-
mon forms of criminality, anti-competition and corrup-
tion, exhibit an extremely high potential for damage. 
Nonetheless, all forms similarly lead to very high net da-
mages (Fuss and Hecker, 2008).
 We see in Table 4 that probability scores are very 
low, while consequence scores are much higher. This im-
plies that white-collar crime is considered quite unlikely, 
while the consequence if occurring is substantial.
 While financial misconduct by chief executives in the 
company is considered unlikely (1.5) on average, some 
respondents (7%) find it likely or very likely. In terms of 
consequence, 28% considered it would be a very great 
consequence if financial misconduct by chief executives 
were occurring. In comparison, 18% considered it would 
be a very great consequence when money laundering 
were occurring, 10% considered it would be a very great 
consequence when fraud of banks, insurance companies 
and others were occurring, while only 5% considered it 
would be a very great consequence when non-existing 
contracts were included in income statements.
 In a study by Bucy et al. (2008), characteristics of or-
ganizations that en courage criminal activity were explo-
red. While most, if not all, legitimate companies originally 
do not actively encourage criminal activity, four corpo-
rate practices and policies might indeed be identified that 
encourage fraud. The first such policy is a corporation 
being driven by the bottom line. An overriding focus on 
profit and meeting the numbers encourage criminal acti-
vity. The second characteristic is lack of an effective cor-
porate compliance plan. The lack of a strong compliance 
plan leaves a company vulnerable to criminal activity.
 The third corporate policy viewed as encouraging 
fraud is lack of internal controls. Ineffective internal 
control is a problem. Companies with a weak and de-
pendent board of directors, lack of external and internal 
auditors, absence of appropriate checks and balances 
throughout the company, and a decentralized manage-
ment structure is noted as being more susceptible to 
fraud. The fourth and final characteristic as key to whe-
ther an organization encourages or discourages fraud 
is corporate culture. When management sends the mes-
sage that questionable behavior would be tolerated, the 
corporate environment is prone to fraud.
 Our statistical correlation analysis has so far concen-
trated on responses to statements about magnitude and 
attitude. Next, the analysis focuses on risk in terms of 
probability and consequence. Correlation coefficients 
for responses to probability of different white-collar 
crime types are listed in Table 5.
The strongest positive correlation found in Table 5 is bet-
ween corruption and embezzlement. This implies that 
respondents who strongly believe that there is corrup-
tion also strongly believe that there is embezzlement in 
the firm. Opposite, respondents who do not at all belie-
ve there is bribery in the firm do not believe either that 
there is theft of valuables in the firm. Similar significant 
relationships in terms of strong correlation coefficients 
can be found between fraud and manipulation, fraud and 
fake invoices, embezzlement and manipulation, and em-
bezzlement and fake invoices.
 Overall, there are very many relationships between 
crime types in terms of significant correlation coeffici-
ents in Table 5. This result is confirmed in the following 
exploratory factor analysis, where only three factors are 
extracted from the ten statements about financial crime 
types, as listed in Table 6.
Police and Criminal Science
Rank Statement Probability Consequence
1 Financial misconduct by chief executives in the company 1.5 3.7
2 Fraud of banks, insurance firms and others 1.5 3.3
3 Manipulation of financial statements and accounting 1.8 3.1
4 Bribery (corruption) from vendors or customers 2.6 3.0
5 Approval of fake invoices in the company 2.0 2.9
6 Tax fraud by manipulation of accounting statements 1.3 2.9
7 Insider trading based on inside information 2.2 2.9
8 Laundering of money from crime in the company 1.3 2.9
9 Non-existing contracts included in income statements 1.3 2.6
10 Embezzlement of valuables from the company 2.4 2.5
Table 4
Average Responses to Questions on Probability and Consequence 
of White-collar Crime (I – Very Unlikely. 5 – Very Likely; 1 – Very 
Little Consequence. 5 – Very Great Consequence)
Corrup-
tion
Miscon-
duct
Tax 
fraud
Inside 
infor-
mati-
on
Em-
bezzle-
ment
Mani-
pula-
tion
Fake in-
voices
Money 
laun-
dering
Fake
con-
tracts
Fraud .362** .380** .169 .213 .275* .416** .420** .249 .188
Corrup-
tion
.324* .172 .282* .622** .408** .316* -.166 .229
Miscon-
duct
.169 -.027 .277* .270* .357** .022 .231
Tax 
fraud
.186 .202 .283* .061 .031 .092
Inside 
informa-
tion
.100 .206 .185 .086 .162
Embezz-
lement
.419** .419** .002 .123
Manipu-
lation
.370** -.100 .257
Fake in-
voices
.087 .194
Money 
launde-
ring
-.024
Table 5
Correlation Coefficients for Probability of Crime Types in the 
Business Corporation (statistical significance of .05 at * and 
of .01 at **)
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 We can apply the first factor as a multiple item sca-
le to measure the likeli hood of financial crime in each 
responding company. The factor consists of six items in 
terms of statements or rather examples of white-collar 
crime. Application of confirmatory' factor analysis leads 
to an acceptable reliability in terms of Cronbachs alpha 
of 0.789. Based on this acceptable reliability, the ave-
rage score for the six-item scale can be computed and be 
applied as a variable measuring the probability of white-
collar crime in the company. The average value of this 
new variable for all respondents is 1.88 on a scale from 
1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely).
 Risk was included in the questionnaire both in 
terms of probability and in terms of consequence. Tab-
le 7 lists all correlation coefficients for responses about 
consequence.
 There are positive and significant correlation coeffici-
ents among almost all crime types in Table 7. The more 
serious the consequence is expected to be for one type 
of white-collar crime, the more serious the consequence 
is expected to be for another type of white-collar crime. 
Opposite, the less serious the consequence is expected 
to be for one kind, the less serious the consequence is 
expected to be for another kind of white-collar crime.
 Exploratory factor analysis seems irrelevant to apply 
here, as there are strong correlations among almost all 
items. Instead, confirmatory factor analysis is applied to 
all items. Given a multiple item scale with nine items, an 
acceptable and very good reliability coefficient in terms 
of Cronbachs alpha of 0.909 is achieved. Therefore, all 
nine types of crime can be applied to measure conse-
quence, while only five crime types were applied to mea-
sure probability of white-collar crime.
 Our study has explored knowledge of white-collar 
crime by mapping execu tives' perceptions of magnitude 
and attitude, probability' and consequence. We find that 
concerning magnitude, that white-collar crime is not 
that widespread in Norway – according to CFOs in the 
largest business corporations. That is their understan-
ding, even though recognizing that this form of crime is 
increasing in recent years. They also believe that white-
collar crime is more common in other industries than 
in their own – independent of what industry they are in 
themselves.
 A common pattern among respondents seems to be 
that their interpretation and knowledge is based on in-
formation and not actual knowledge based on their own 
experience. Moreover, they seem to have a distance to 
these forms of crime. That is probably why their corpo-
rate competence in detecting crime is rated 2.8, which 
represents a slight disagreement with the statement 
that “companies are generally competent at disclosing 
white-collar crime”.
 The same is the case for the special finance police 
force, where 2.8 as com petence is not that convincing, 
Police and Criminal Science
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Fraud of banks, insurance firms and others .577
Corruption from vendors or customers .682
Misconduct of finances by chief executive in the company .690
Tax fraud by manipulation of accounting statements .680
inside information for insider trading .786
Embezzlement of valuables from the company .757
Manipulation of financial statements and accounting .606
Fake invoices accepted and reimbursed by the company .715
Money laundering by the company .895
Fake contracts included in income statements -
Table 6
Exploratory Factor Analysis of Respondents’ Score Regarding Pro-
bability of Different White-collar Crimes in the Company
Corruption Mis-conduct Tax
fraud
Inside
infor-mation
Em-bezzle-
ment
Manipu-lation Fake
invoices
Money
launder-ing
Fake
con-tracts
Fraud .431** .589** .505** .288* .445** .407** .481** .563** .439**
Corrup-
tion
.334* .387** .537** .530** .410** .452** .475** .542**
Miscon-
duct
.568** .214 .497** .521** .514** .575** .366**
Tax fraud .595** .501** .679** .500** .644** .459**
Inside 
informa-
tion
.404** .519** .285* .344* .487**
Embezzle-
ment
.456** .563** .511** .377**
Manipula-
tion
.581** .601** .560**
Fake 
invoices
.667** .559**
Money 
launde-
ring
.590**
Table 7
Relationships in Terms of Correlation Coefficients between Respondents’ Rating of Consequence of Various Types of White-collar Crime 
in the Company (Statistical Significance of .05 at * and .01 at **)
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as it represents a slight disagreement with the state-
ment. This can be related to the second main percep-
tion, namely attitudes towards white-collar crime. Our 
findings show a tendency that increased crime increases 
bagatelle, and that this kind of crime tends to be treated 
as something trivial. But at the same time, the results 
vary concerning an actual growth. Actually, it seems that 
our respondents believe that financial crises result in 
more financial crime, because the offenders themselves 
are the first to experience the negative effects of finan-
cial difficulties. This simple cause and effect perception 
can also be related to this type of crime being of minor 
importance or more trivial, and thus, bagatelle. That is 
also one of the statements, that white-collar crime has 
a tendency to be bagatelle in society, although respon-
dents on average disagree a little with this statement 
by an average score of 2.9 in the survey. Other forms 
of crime can be more important to investigate and have 
more serious consequences than financial consequen-
ces, such as murder, rape and other serious harm to hu-
man beings.
 In terms of know ledge, white-collar crime often 
needs to be discovered in ternally in the organization. 
This implies organizations being aware of possibili ties 
of financial crime, and creating necessary routines and 
control functions in order to prevent this crime from hap-
pening. To fight white-collar crime, co operation between 
police and victimized organization is necessary, which 
makes a contribution to prevent and not bagatelle finan-
cial crime. A statement of general knowledge of this kind 
of crime (2.8) and know ledge within the special police 
force (2.8) show that the executives' perceptions indi-
cate that they have about the same level of know ledge 
concerning white-collar crime as the finance police.
 It would probably have been more reassuring, if their 
perception of the police knowledge on white-collar crime 
had been more convincing. Especially since they on one 
hand believe that their competence is quite average and 
at the same time state that financial police is competent 
at investigating white-collar crime. Interesting is also to 
note, to what extent we would find that the police force 
prioritize obtaining necessary knowledge and investiga-
tion skills of white-collar crime.
Challenges in Crime Detection
There was an open-ended question in the questionnaire 
concerned with challenges of white-collar crime detec-
tion. The question was formulated like this: Why can it 
be difficult to detect, investigate and prosecute white-
collar crime?
 Some respondents focused on the offender in their 
responses. Examples include:
 “This kind of crime is committed by persons who 
have access to resources and who have rich knowledge 
of the business and know how to hide tracks.”
 “Executives are in charge of control mechanisms and 
management accounting. When they themselves com-
mit financial crime, they manipulate internal control and 
management auditing.”
 “Whistle-blowing to the top is risky, since the recei-
ver of the message may be involved in the crime.”
 Other respondents focused on the offense in their re-
sponses. Examples in clude:
 “You need to get into the details, often single items in 
an invoice, to be able to detect misconduct. Very often it 
is difficult to find tracks in accounting systems.”
“It takes a long time to detect, so the offender has time 
to launder tracks.”
 “Methods applied by criminal executives become 
more and more sophisticated.”
 A third group of responses focused on shortcomings 
in control mechanisms. Examples include:
 “International trade and transactions with a number 
of vendors and customers makes it extremely difficult for 
local auditors to follow paths from origin to destination.”
 “We live in a society where we trust each other. We 
are not suspicious enough.”
 “Internal control systems are often weak, and there 
is a lack of rules for top management.”
 This classification of responses into three categories 
resulted from content analysis, where the three catego-
ries can be labelled as follows:
 Criminal. The white-collar criminal is in charge, has 
access to resources and is trusted too long.
Crime. The white-collar crime is found in the details, and 
tracks have been laundered away before investigation 
starts.
 Control. Transactions across borders and accounting 
systems are difficult to detect by limited and deficient 
auditing procedures.
 In addition, many respondents seem to indicate that 
there is an imbalance between control systems and 
trust, where control systems are deficient while trust is 
at an unreasonable high level. Top executives are trus-
ted until there is concrete evidence internally or conti-
nued criticism externally.
As a consequence of criminal characteristics, crime cha-
racteristics, control characteristics and imbalance bet-
ween control and trust, white-collar crime seem difficult 
to detect and investigate. A research model illustrating 
this causal relationship is shown in Figure 1.
 Three hypotheses are implicit in the research model 
that might be explored in future research:
 - H1. Higher competence by white-collar criminals 
causes increased complexity in crime investigation.
 - H2. More sophisticated white-collar crime causes in-
creased complexity in crime investigation.
 - H3. Greater imbalance between trust in white-collar 
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employees and control of white-collar employees cau-
ses increased complexity in crime investigation.
 Langfield-Smith and Smith (2003) introduced a 
framework for design of management control systems. 
This framework includes characteristics of the transac-
tion, the actors, the environment, the control mecha-
nisms, as well as trust. The framework seems to address 
many of the issues listed by respondents in our survev.
 Hansen (2009) argues that prevention of corpo-
rate crime should not be only the concern of regulato-
ry and law enforcement agencies. Corporations stand to 
lose more than reputation when financial scandals oc-
cur. Even when white-collar crime does not reach Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Enron or WorldCom proportions, cor-
porations are damaged. It is estimated that white-collar 
crime can cost companies on average six percent of an-
nual sales.
 Hansen (2009) suggests three solutions for control-
ling corporate and white-collar crime:
 - 1. Voluntary change in both corporate attitudes and 
structure. Professionals should be held accountable 
to their various professional groups, such as doctors, 
lawyers, and other professions. Another deterrent to 
corporate crime is the social, rather than legal con-
sequence of criminal activities. Because elite cri-
minals are just that – elite – their social identity is 
institutionalized in the social strata they occupy and 
the impact of the prison term is intensified. In other 
words, the bigger they are, the harder they fall. The-
re is some belief that informal sanctions (i.e. expul-
sion from professional community) in conjunction 
with fear of formal punishment prevent most indivi-
duals from committing crimes. However, unlike their 
street crime counterparts, white-collar criminals ra-
rely receive long prison sentences.
 - 2. Strong intervention of the political state to force 
changes in corporate structure.
 - 3. Legal measures to deter or to punish or consumer 
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actions (hurting corpo ration in the pocket-book may 
be the only way to get their attention).
 Policing financial crime – according to Pickett and 
Pickett (2002) – is con cerned with whistle blowing and 
detection, roles of shareholders and main board, chief 
executive officer and senior executives, investigations, 
and forensics. Policing financial crime – according to 
Levi (2007) – is concerned with the organization of poli-
cing deception, the contexts of police undercover work, 
covert investigations of white-collar crime, prosecution 
and relationship to policing fraud. Covert activity is re-
stricted mainly to the informal obtaining of financial in-
formation or the official obtaining of information about 
suspected bank accounts without the knowledge of the 
account-holder.
 Next to corporate governance, corporate social re-
sponsibility is often men tioned as a mechanism to pre-
vent white-collar crime. Corporate social responsi bility 
is a concept related to the behavior and conduct of cor-
porations and those who are associated with them. Du-
ring the best of times, it is a concept adopted and taken 
for granted. During the worst of times, however, corpo-
rate social responsibility becomes a threatening concept 
for most business as well as public organizations (Jaya-
suriya, 2006). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a 
set of voluntary corporate actions designed to improve 
corporate actions. These corporate actions not required 
by the law attempt to further some social good and ex-
tend beyond the explicit transactional interests of the 
firm. The voluntary nature of CSR means that these acti-
vities can be viewed as gifts or grants from the corpora-
tion to various stakeholder groups (Godfrey et al., 2009).
 Basu and Palazzo (2008) define corporate social re-
sponsibility as the process by which managers within 
an organization think about and discuss relationships 
with stake-holders as well as their roles in relation to 
the common good, along with their behavioral disposi-
tion with respect to the fulfillment and achievement of 
these roles and relationships. It is an intrinsic part of an 
organization’s character, with the potential to discrimi-
nate it from other organizations that might adopt diffe-
rent types of processes.
 Corporate social responsibility is a concept by which 
business enterprises integrate the principles of social 
and environmental responsibility in their operations as 
well as in the way they interact with their stake-holders. 
This definition shows two perspectives. First, social and 
environment responsibility in their operations requi-
res internal change processes to integrate the princip-
les into business operations. Second, interactions with 
stake-holders require stake-holder engagement (Zollo et 
al., 2009).
 The concept of corporate social responsibility develo-
ped as a reaction against the classical and neo-classical 
Criminal Competence
Crime Sophistication Investigation Complexity
Control Trust Imbalance
Figure 1
Research Model Derived from Survey Responses
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recommendations from economics, where rational deci-
sion-making and free markets are concentrated solely 
on profits. This narrow economic view has been ques-
tioned due to inconsistencies with the economic model 
and the evidence of unethical business practices. These 
problems have led to the realization that organizations 
should also be accountable for the social and environ-
mental consequences of their activities (Mostovicz et al., 
2009).
 Both internal and external regulation in terms of pub-
lic control and corporate governance combined with cor-
porate social responsibility is needed to combat white-
collar crime in business organizations. This is because 
white-collar crime has characteristics making detection 
and investigation resource demanding. As indicated by 
respondents in the presented survey research, characte-
ristics include characteristics of the criminal, the crime, 
the control as well as the imbalance between control and 
trust.
 The purpose of this text was to analyze knowledge of 
white-collar crime among executives in Norwegian busi-
ness organizations. Consequently, we conducted an em-
pirical study to explore their perceptions of magnitude 
and attitude, probability and consequence. A number of 
insights have emerged from our analysis. First, most re-
spondents believe there is more financial crime in other 
industries than in their own. They also find that white-
collar crime is increasing, but suggest that the probabi-
lity' is low, due to the consequences being substantial. 
Next, the most significant consequence of white-collar 
crime will occur if there is financial misconduct by a 
chief executive in the company.
Expert A
In an approach with several scholars analyzing respon-
ses by applying content analysis, an alternative classifi-
cation of issues was developed in this study:
1. Organizational culture, values, ethics and attitudes.
2. Administrative systems, processes, management 
systems, rules and rou tines.
3. Internal control and other control routines.
4. Leadership, role models, open discussions, value-
based management.
5. Reactions and sanctions, whistle blowing, punish-
ment, law enforcement. An analytical framework 
might be applied to classify actions of prevention.
A distinction is made between formal and informal mea-
sures. Values, attitudes and behaviors are informal ac-
tions, while guide-lines, code of conduct and rules are 
formal actions. There is some belief that informal sanc-
tions (i.e. expulsion from professional community) in con-
junction with fear of formal punishment prevent most in-
dividuals from committing crimes. However, unlike their 
street crime counterparts, white-collar criminals rarely 
receive long prison sentences (Hansen, 2009). A distinc-
tion can also be made between actions that are aimed at 
individuals and actions that are aimed at part of or the 
whole organization.
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